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 With the passage of the Deregulation Act of 1978 the 
government unknowingly hastened the arrival of the “Hub and 
Spoke” system of airline operations.  The passage of this 
act along with the increasing use of smaller commuter 
planes has caused the airlines to over schedule many of the 
larger hub airports in the United States causing many 
delays in the nation’s air traffic control system. 
 Of the large hub airports in the United States a 
convenience sample was taken to ensure the needed data was 
present. Schedule data for the time period of May 2004 – 
June 2004 was collected and analyzed to find the impact 
that airline scheduling had on airport delays. 
 Throughout the research it became clear that all the 
airports studied were not affected equally by airline 
scheduling, and that a handful of these airports operations 






Ever since the Deregulation Act of 1978 airlines have 
been using the hub and spoke system.  This causes enormous 
congestion at the “hub” airports.  It also creates many en-
route delays for aircraft coming into those airports and at 
times gridlock for the aircraft attempting to leave. 
(Federal Aviation Administration, (1995, Dec.) 
 
But what is the cause of all of these delays?  Is it 
as some suggest a problem with the air traffic control 
system?  Is it an airline-scheduling problem?  Is it 
because the current airports are to small to accommodate 
all of the planes?  It may be a combination of these things 
and more. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to determine the extent 
airline scheduling causes airport delays at larger hub 
airports. The study will also attempt to provide 





STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
There are many reasons for the delays we now face 
going into “hub” airports, but for now lets just look at 
the scheduling aspect. If you watch traffic flow at a place 
like Chicago O’Hare International airport it doesn’t take 
very long before you start to realize that the airport is 
only truly busy at certain times of the days while at other 
times they have very little going on.  So the question begs 
to be asked, do the airlines cause a significant amount of 
their own problems by scheduling most of their flights at 
only certain times of the day? 
If they do cause their own problems why do they 
continue?  Why not just change their schedule so they don’t 
have the delays?  We can assume that in the end it all 
comes down to profit.  That is when the people want to fly 
so that is when they will fly them.  Is this really cost 
effective?  How much money do the airlines lose, just 
because of lost fuel, when they take airborne delays going 
into an airport? Is that greater than the amount that they 
would lose if they changed their schedule?  Not only is it 
a flawed practice to get into from a delay standpoint but 
it is inherently dangerous.  In a business that values on-
time service it seem inconceivable that the airlines will 
not willingly give up their current scheduling practices.  
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So it will be up to the government to implement any 
changes.   
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 This study will attempt to determine the extent 
that airline scheduling has on delays at major hub 
airports. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How many hours per day have the airlines 
scheduled more than the maximum number of 
aircraft at major hub airports? 
2. How long does the system take to recover for 
the over scheduling of aircraft at major hub 
airports? 
3. How much of their total percentage are these 
airports using with current scheduling 
practices? 
CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The concept of supply and demand determines to a great 
extent how businesses operate, and the airline industry is 
no exception.  The airlines must always take into 
consideration when passengers would like to travel.  In 
some cases, however there is a limit to the supply, to be 
balanced against an ever increasing demand. In other words 
there are a lot more passengers who would like to fly out 
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of a given airport at specific time, than the airport can 
accommodate. The result is the airlines have a demand of 
more slots of aircraft than the airports can accommodate.  
DEFINITIONS 
Enroute delays – Delays taken by aircraft while up in the 
air. 
Ground delays – Delays taken by aircraft while on the 
ground. 
Weather delays – Delays taken by aircraft while on the 
ground or in the air but solely due to weather. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The first assumption is that the airlines over 
schedule major hub airports at numerous times during the 
day. 
 The second assumption is that the airlines lose a 
significant amount of money due to scheduling delays caused 
by trying to accommodate the flying public. 
LIMITATIONS 
 This study has several limitations.  There isn’t any 
way to do a complete study for each airport because this 
problem only exists at larger hub airports, and also there 




CHAPTER II:  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will review the works related to the 
proposed research topic, the effect of passenger attitudes 
on airline scheduling delays.  Some of the works deal with 
just scheduling delays, some with delays in general, some 
with the effect delays have on passengers, and some deal 
with airline scheduling itself. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The purpose of this review is to discuss the research 
that has already been done on aircraft delays.  This review 
will be divided into two sections:  Airline Delays: 
scheduling and otherwise, and the effect delays have on 
passengers. 
Airline Delays 
 The airlines and the FAA clearly understand what 
causes the majority of delays in the national airspace. 
(House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
(2001, April) Finding the delays are not the problem; it is 
finding the solution that causes trouble. 
The effects of weather cause most delays in the 
enroute phase of flight causing massive rerouting of 
traffic. This is the largest single factor causing delays 
and it happens almost every day in the spring and summer.  
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(House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
2001) 
Another type of delay is scheduling delays. According 
to the Subcommittee on Transportation Appropriations, DOT 
Inspector General Ken Mead only 11% of all delays in the 
National Airspace System were due to airline scheduling. 
Mr. Mead also said “a set of capacity benchmarks is 
essential in understanding the impact of air carrier 
scheduling practices.” (House Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, 2001) One of the problems with the 
benchmarks is they are strictly capacity benchmarks for the 
airline schedule and nothing else, no impacts, no 
measurements.   
It would be wrong to assume that anytime a scheduling 
peak is observed above the capacity benchmark that airlines 
are involved in some sort of scheduling abuse.  In order to 
assess the impact of a schedule, we must know if the delay 
was caused by schedule.  According to Jack Ryan (Acting 
Senior Vice President – Aviation Safety and Operations at 
the Air Transport Association of America) what’s missing 
from the FAA’s effort is an analysis of the delays caused 
by scheduling, if any.  After all, some delay is accepted 
in all modes of transportation as a result of accommodating 
demand, when people are free to select the time when they 
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intend to travel. (House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 2001) 
  The consulting firm of Landrum and Brown was asked by 
the Air Transport Association of America to conduct a study 
to determine the delay created by scheduling alone at the 
Atlanta airport before and after a schedule change.  Delta 
Air Lines implemented a scheduling change at Atlanta on 
April 1st 2001.  (House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure) 
The new schedule decreased the bank size from 90 to 
75; it increased the number of banks from 10 to 12, and 
decreased the time between banks.  In other words the 
flights used to come in, in 10 groups per day, each with as 
many as 90 aircraft. In April, they changed that to 70 
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As you can see, the waiting times were substantially 
reduced especially in the 2000-hour where the wait time was 
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 According to Mr. Ryan, each airline understands 
its role in serving passengers and will not impose onerous 
delays because of its scheduling practices.  Airlines can 
and will make schedule changes to reduce delay.  The 
benchmarks – by themselves – should not be used as the 
preeminent tool to address delay problems. The FAA and the 
airline industry must continue their daily cooperative 
effort to reduce the biggest cause of delays – those caused 
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by weather. (House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 2001) 
 Another reason for delays is the airport 
capacities inability to meet scheduling demands.  The 
problem is that capacity is not growing as fast as demand.  
In the long term, this problem has to be addressed by 
expansion.  The Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 
21st Century (AIR 21), Public Law 106-181, became law on 
April 6, 2000 and provided the funding necessary for 
airports to build new runways and enhance existing ones.  
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2000, July.) Airport 
construction is not as easy as it seems however.  One of 
the biggest challenges to expansion, besides just the 
construction, lies in the slow pace of identifying the 
environmental safeguards that need to be done along with 
the expansion.   
Another often cited cause of delays is the outdated 
equipment that makes up the air traffic control system.  
When the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century became law it also unlocked money in the aviation 
trust fund for the purchase of new ATC equipment as well as 
the airport construction mentioned above.   
With more modern equipment, there should be fewer 
outages.   Also, modern computer equipment will provide a 
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platform for upgraded software that will do more to 
alleviate delays.  The current HOST software used by the 
FAA ATC system was built and designed in the 1960’s. 
Some airlines have even suggested that they be given 
limited antitrust immunity, like they had in the early 
eighties, in order to meet and adjust their schedules to 
reduce the number of flights at certain hours. Others have 
suggested determining the capacity of each airport, which 
could lead to a limit on the number of flights. (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2000, July.) 
So as you can see there are a number of different 
things that can cause delays. Now we will take a look at 
how those delays can affect passengers.  
The effect delays have on passengers 
 Airport congestion and the subsequent delays are 
making air travel an increasingly frustrating experience 
for passengers.  Air travel has doubled since 1980.  With 
this growth has come growth in delays and cancellation, and 
customer dissatisfaction with air carrier customer service.  
Delays increased 50 percent from 1995 to 1999.  
Cancellations increased 68 percent, from 91,905 to 154,311 
flights, between the same time periods.  Much of the delay 
time is occurring on the ground in the form of longer taxi 
times.  The number of flights having taxi-out times of 1 
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hour or more increased 130 percent, from 17,164 flights 
delayed in 1995 to 39,523 flights delayed in 1999. (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2000 June.) 
In 1999 the DOT Air Travel Consumer Report disclosed 
that consumer complaints against more than doubled from 
1998 to 1999.  From 7,980 to 17,381, with more than a 115 
percent increase in the number of complaints relating to 
flight problems (delays, cancellations and missed 
connections).  (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2000 
June.)  
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Over the last part of the 1990’s the DOT has ranked 
flight problems as the number one air traveler complaint, 
with customer care and baggage complaints ranked as either 
two or three. (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2000 
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June.) So as you can see the majority of complaints 
passengers have is with regards to delays, cancellations 
and missed connections. 
SUMMARY/ABSTRACT 
There are many different things that can cause delays:  
outdated air traffic control equipment, unforeseen weather 
phenomenon, lack of capacity on the ground at hub airports, 
and scheduling problems to name a few.  There are also a 
number of reasons that a passenger can become disenchanted 
with the flying process:  customer care, lost baggage, 
refunds, reservations ticketing, & boarding, and flight 
problems such as delays cancellations and missed 
connections are also reasons for disenchanted passengers.   
This study will focus on the amount of delays caused 
by current airline scheduling practices.   
The study will involve analyzing existing FAA data on 
airline scheduling delays to determine the following items: 
1. How many hours per day have the airlines scheduled 
more than the maximum number of aircraft at major 
hub airports? 
2. How long does the system take to recover for the 
over scheduling of aircraft at major hub airports? 
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3. How much of their total percentage are these 




































CHAPTER III:  PROCEDURES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This section will describe the procedures that will be 
used in the study.  The study will be composed of analysis 
of quantitative data on airline scheduling delays. 
POPULATION 
 The population will be all the major hub airports 
in the United States. 
SAMPLE 
The sample will be a convenience sample based upon 
available scheduling data for the major hub airports. 
STUDY DESIGN 
 
The study will use scheduling data from 8 major hub 
airports in the United States selected by a convenience 
sample. The data will be analyzed to determine the number 
of hours a day that the airlines over schedule airports and 
also to determine the time that it takes for the system to 
recover from the over scheduling. 
DATA COLLECTION METHODS/PROCEDURES 
Data will be collected from existing FAA scheduling 
data on the airports involved. Data will be divided into 
15-minute periods from 7 AM until 10 PM local time.  The 
schedules for each day of the week, Sunday through 
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Saturday, will be averaged over three months for both a 
peak and an off-peak season at each airport.  Although 
traffic on weekdays is slightly higher than traffic on the 
weekends, using the schedule for all seven days will allow 
for the inclusion of the busy Sunday evening period.   
INSTRUMENT RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
 
 The FAA is known to be a reliable source for 
information on airline scheduling practices. The data for 
each airport can easily be compared to that of the other 
airports. 
PROPOSED DATA ANALYSIS 
 All data will be quantitative and will be compiled in 
an orderly manner to be analyzed. The changes over time 
will be converted into percentages to better be able to 
compare the data. The change in delays will be expressed as 
a percentage change. An analysis of this data will be 
performed to find any differences between the different 
airports.  
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 
  There will be no research involving human subjects. An 





                    CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
 
The data used for the research was obtained from the 
Federal Aviation Administration. 
A
 
irports Selected for analysis 
• Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) 
• Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) 
• Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL) 
• Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL) 
• Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) 
• Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) 
• New York LaGuardia Airport (LGA) 
• Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) 
• Philadelphia International Airport (PHL) 
• Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) 
 
All the information was obtained and analyzed in order 
to answer the two research questions that this study put 
forth:  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How many times per day have the airlines 
scheduled more than the maximum number of 
aircraft at major hub airports? 
2. How long does the system take to recover for 
the over scheduling of aircraft at major hub 
airports? 
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3. How much of their total percentage are these 
airports using with current scheduling 
practices? 
The following analysis of data will fully answer these 
questions. 
Data Related to Research Questions 
 
All of the delay data for this study was obtained from 
the Federal Aviation Administration. 
Each of the following charts used show scheduled 
traffic (arrivals, departures, or total operations) in 15-
minute periods from 7 AM until 10 PM local time.  The FAA 
averaged the schedules for each day of the week, Sunday 
through Saturday over three months for both a peak and an 
off-peak season at each airport.  Although traffic on 
weekdays is normally higher than traffic on the weekends, 
Sunday evening is generally very busy, using the schedule 
for all seven days allows for the inclusion of the busier 
Sunday evening period.   
Each chart also shows the Current Optimum and IFR 
benchmark values, adjusted for the 15-minute period.   
The arrival and departure benchmark rates indicate the 
number of flights that the airport could be expected to 
handle during an hour, given a typical operational 
configuration.  The actual number of operations during that 
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period is a result of many factors such as traffic 
schedules, weather, and the runway configuration in use.  
En route airspace congestion and delays at other airports 
may also affect the actual number of operations, especially 
if programs such as ground delay are implemented.  The ATC 
facility at the airport constantly advises the Air Traffic 
Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) of the number of 
arrivals and departures that they expect to be able to 
handle based on conditions at the airport, taking into 
account the weather and runway configuration.  These 
airport called rates, the Airport Arrival Rate (AAR) and 
the Airport Departure Rate (ADR), reflect actual conditions 
at the airport during the given time period.  The called 
rate may be as high as the Optimum rate or lower than the 
IFR rate; the average usually lies in between, depending on 
the weather and runway configurations in use during the 
charted period. (FAA, Benchmark Values and Airline 
Schedules 2004) 
A sample chart, for arrivals at EWR during the period 







Figure 4 – Schedule vs. Benchmarks at EWR 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
Scheduled carrier operations constitute a significant 
part, but not all, of an airport’s traffic.  Non-scheduled 
traffic includes air taxi flights, military operations, 
general aviation (including charter flights), and some 
cargo operations.  Scheduled flights, including air 
carriers and commuter carriers, accounted for approximately 
78-98 percent of the total traffic at these ten airports 
during 2002 and 2003, according to the FAA Terminal Area 







Selected Airports and Percentage of Scheduled Operations 
 
Airport Airport Name 
Air Carrier, 
Commuter and Air 
Taxi Operations 
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport 98% 
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 97% 
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport 97% 
FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport 78% 
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport 79% 
IAH Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport 95% 
LGA New York LaGuardia Airport 97% 
MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport 89% 









Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
The following charts depict airline and commuter 
schedules only. The effect of the non-scheduled traffic is 
unknown.  Some of the non-scheduled flights may use a 
separate runway, or they may try to avoid operating during 
the busy periods for the air carriers.  Non-scheduled 
flights may have some impact on delay during the busy times 
of the day at some airports, even though air carrier 
operations are the main component of operations. 
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Figure 5 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport from May – July 2004 
Figure: 5 
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Note:  Average Called  Rate 
of 46.7 is slight ly below  
Opt imum Rate  of  47.0.
 
Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
International Airports IFR capacity is 40 aircraft per 15 
minutes. It also shows that the airport was scheduled, on 
average, at or over its IFR capacity for 35 out of the 56 
fifteen minute increments shown.  The airport was scheduled 
for an average of 39.88 aircraft per 15 minutes for the 
three months. Therefore if everything went as scheduled the 
airport was operating at 99.7% of its IFR capacity. 
Assuming an average of a 2 minute separation between 
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aircraft per runway (based upon air traffic control 
regulations and procedures) the over scheduling of 
operations from 8:00 until 9:00 of 62 aircraft would take a 
minimum of 24.8 minutes to correct, assuming the airport 
was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing all 5 of 
the available runways. If only four runways were available 
the over scheduling would take 31 minutes to correct, 
assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at the airport 
during that time. 
Figure 6 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Dallas/Forth Worth International 
airport from May – July 2004 
Figure: 6 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
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 This figure shows that Dallas/Forth Worth Airports IFR 
capacity is 48 aircraft per 15 minutes. It also shows that 
the airport was scheduled, on average, at or over its IFR 
capacity for 6 out of the 56 fifteen minute increments 
shown.  The airport was scheduled for an average of 33.97 
aircraft per 15 minutes for the three months. Therefore if 
everything went as scheduled the airport was operating at 
70.8% of its IFR capacity. Assuming an average of a 2 
minute separation between aircraft per runway (based upon 
air traffic control regulations and procedures) the over 
scheduling of operations from 8:00 until 9:00 of 7 aircraft 
would take a minimum of 2.33 minutes to correct, assuming 
the airport was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing 
all 6 of the available runways. If only five runways were 
available the over scheduling would take 2.8 minutes to 
correct, assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at 
the airport during that time. 
Figure 7 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Newark Liberty International airport 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Newark Liberty International 
Airports IFR capacity is 16 aircraft per 15 minutes. It 
also shows that the airport was scheduled, on average, at 
or over its IFR capacity for 35 out of the 56 fifteen 
minute increments shown.  The airport was scheduled for an 
average of 16.86 aircraft per 15 minutes for the three 
months. Therefore if everything went as scheduled the 
airport was operating at 105.4% of its IFR capacity. 
Assuming an average of a 2 minute separation between 
aircraft per runway (based upon air traffic control 
regulations and procedures) the over scheduling of 
operations from 14:00 until 19:30 of 103 aircraft would 
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take a minimum of 68.67 minutes to correct, assuming the 
airport was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing all 
3 of the available runways. If only 2 runways were 
available the over scheduling would take 103 minutes to 
correct, assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at 
the airport during that time.   
Figure 8 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 
International airport from May – July 2004 
Figure: 8 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 
International Airports IFR capacity is 15 aircraft per 15 
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minutes. It also shows that the airport was scheduled, on 
average, at or over its IFR capacity for 1 out of the 56 
fifteen minute increments shown.  The airport was scheduled 
for an average of 8.63 aircraft per 15 minutes for the 
three months. Therefore if everything went as scheduled the 
airport was operating at 57.5% of its IFR capacity. 
Assuming an average of a 2 minute separation between 
aircraft per runway (based upon air traffic control 
regulations and procedures) the over scheduling of 
operations from 11:00 until 12:00 of 1 aircraft would take 
a minimum of .67 minutes to correct, assuming the airport 
was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing all 3 of 
the available runways. If only 2 runways were available the 
over scheduling would take 1 minute to correct, assuming 
there is no other traffic scheduled at the airport during 
that time.   
Figure 9 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Washington Dulles International 
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Note: Average Called Rate 
of  27.66 is slight ly less than 
IFR Rate of 28.25. 
 
Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
This figure shows that Washington Dulles International 
Airports IFR capacity is 28 aircraft per 15 minutes. It 
also shows that the airport was scheduled, on average, at 
or over its IFR capacity for 1 out of the 56 fifteen minute 
increments shown.  The airport was scheduled for an average 
of 14.15 aircraft per 15 minutes for the three months. 
Therefore if everything went as scheduled the airport was 
operating at 50.5% of its IFR capacity. Assuming an average 
of a 2 minute separation between aircraft per runway (based 
upon air traffic control regulations and procedures) the 
over scheduling of operations from 11:00 until 12:00 of 1 
aircraft would take a minimum of .67 minutes to correct, 
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assuming the airport was operating at maximum capacity and 
utilizing all 3 of the available runways. If only 2 runways 
were available the over scheduling would take 1 minute to 
correct, assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at 
the airport during that time.   
Figure 10 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Houston George Bush Intercontinental 
airport from May – July 2004 
Figure: 10 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Houston George bush 
Intercontinental Airports IFR capacity is 28 aircraft per 
15 minutes. It also shows that the airport was scheduled, 
 29
on average, at or over its IFR capacity for 21 out of the 
56 fifteen minute increments shown.  The airport was 
scheduled for an average of 21.65 aircraft per 15 minutes 
for the three months. Therefore if everything went as 
scheduled the airport was operating at 77.32% of its IFR 
capacity. Assuming an average of a 2 minute separation 
between aircraft per runway (based upon air traffic control 
regulations and procedures) the over scheduling of 
operations from 13:00 until 14:00 of 30 aircraft would take 
a minimum of 12 minutes to correct, assuming the airport 
was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing all 5 of 
the available runways. If only 4 runways were available the 
over scheduling would take 15 minutes to correct, assuming 
there is no other traffic scheduled at the airport during 
that time.   
Figure 11 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at New York La Guardia airport from May 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that New York La Guardia Airports 
IFR capacity is 18 aircraft per 15 minutes. It also shows 
that the airport was scheduled, on average, at or over its 
IFR capacity for 20 out of the 56 fifteen minute increments 
shown.  The airport was scheduled for an average of 16.98 
aircraft per 15 minutes for the three months. Therefore if 
everything went as scheduled the airport was operating at 
94.33% of its IFR capacity. Assuming an average of a 2 
minute separation between aircraft per runway (based upon 
air traffic control regulations and procedures) the over 
scheduling of operations from 9:00 until 9:30 of 12 
aircraft would take a minimum of 12 minutes to correct, 
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assuming the airport was operating at maximum capacity and 
utilizing all 2 of the available runways. If only 1 runway 
were available the over scheduling would take 24 minutes to 
correct, assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at 
the airport during that time.   
Figure 12 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
airport from May – July 2004 
Figure: 12 
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of 29.3 is slight ly below 
Opt imum Rate of 30.0.
 
Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Minneapolis-St. Paul 
International Airports IFR capacity is 28 aircraft per 15 
minutes. It also shows that the airport was scheduled, on 
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average, at or over its IFR capacity for 16 out of the 56 
fifteen minute increments shown.  The airport was scheduled 
for an average of 21.34 aircraft per 15 minutes for the 
three months. Therefore if everything went as scheduled the 
airport was operating at 76.21% of its IFR capacity. 
Assuming an average of a 2 minute separation between 
aircraft per runway (based upon air traffic control 
regulations and procedures) the over scheduling of 
operations from 10:00 until 10:45 of 20 aircraft would take 
a minimum of 10 minutes to correct, assuming the airport 
was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing all 4 of 
the available runways. If only 3 runway were available the 
over scheduling would take 13.33 minutes to correct, 
assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at the airport 
during that time.   
Figure 13 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Chicago O’Hare International airport 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Chicago O’Hare International 
Airports IFR capacity is 35 aircraft per 15 minutes. It 
also shows that the airport was scheduled, on average, at 
or over its IFR capacity for 45 out of the 56 fifteen 
minute increments shown.  The airport was scheduled for an 
average of 42.54 aircraft per 15 minutes for the three 
months. Therefore if everything went as scheduled the 
airport was operating at 121.54% of its IFR capacity. 
Assuming an average of a 2 minute separation between 
aircraft per runway (based upon air traffic control 
regulations and procedures) the over scheduling of 
operations from 15:30 until 19:00 of 198 aircraft would 
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take a minimum of 66 minutes to correct, assuming the 
airport was operating at maximum capacity and utilizing all 
6 of the available runways. If only 5 runway were available 
the over scheduling would take 79.2 minutes to correct, 
assuming there is no other traffic scheduled at the airport 
during that time.   
Figure 14 shows the average scheduling versus the 
capacity benchmarks at Philadelphia International airport 
from May – July 2004 
Figure: 14 
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Source: FAA Benchmark Values and Airline Schedules 
 This figure shows that Philadelphia International 
Airports IFR capacity is 24 aircraft per 15 minutes. It 
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also shows that the airport was scheduled, on average, at 
or over its IFR capacity for 7 out of the 56 fifteen minute 
increments shown.  The airport was scheduled for an average 
of 17.37 aircraft per 15 minutes for the three months. 
Therefore if everything went as scheduled the airport was 
operating at 72.37% of its IFR capacity. Assuming an 
average of a 2 minute separation between aircraft per 
runway (based upon air traffic control regulations and 
procedures) the over scheduling of operations from 17:30 
until 18:00 of 5 aircraft would take a minimum of 3.33 
minutes to correct, assuming the airport was operating at 
maximum capacity and utilizing all 3 of the available 
runways. If only 2 runway were available the over 
scheduling would take 5 minutes to correct, assuming there 
is no other traffic scheduled at the airport during that 
time.  
 Table 2 ranks each airport based upon the percentage 
of aircraft scheduled at each airport in relation to the 






Table 2: Percentage of IFR capacity utilization 
Airport Airport Name Percentage of IFR capacity 
ORD Chicago O’Hare International Airport 121.54% 
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport 105.4% 
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport 99.7% 
LGA New York LaGuardia Airport 94.33% 
IAH Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport 77.32% 
MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport 76.21% 
PHL Philadelphia International Airport 72.37% 
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 70.8% 
FLL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport 57.5% 
















SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of 
airline scheduling practice on airport delays.  The study 
was entirely quantitative using only data publicly 
available through the Federal Aviation Administration and 
submitted in accordance with federal regulations.  The data 
was presented through use of charts, which at the same time 
simplified that analysis of the data. 
Summary 
 This study attempted to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. How many times per day have the airlines 
scheduled more than the maximum number of 
aircraft at major hub airports? 
2. How long does the system take to recover for 
the over scheduling of aircraft at major hub 
airports? 
3. How much of their total percentage are these 




This summary is based on the data presented in Chapter 
IV and will refer to those figures when applicable. The 
data was used to show delay trends at ten different 
airports over a three month period during 2004. Figures 5 
through 14 show the delay data for each individual airport 
that was selected for this study.  The IFR capacity of each 
airport was deemed the most accurate capacity to judge the 
airlines schedule against based upon the fact that in 
almost every instance the air traffic control procedures 
for all the airports studied are based upon IFR procedures 
and separation standards.  The airports used in this study 
were selected by a convenience sample based upon the 
availability of data for major hub airports.  
It was expected that all airports would be different, 
but throughout the analysis it was also expected that each 
airport was, at least, moderately affected by over 
scheduling by the airlines. Table 2 was compiled by using 
information calculated from the tables and was used as a 
comparison of airports based upon the airlines schedule 
with respect to the IFR capacity of each airport. 
When comparing the airports it became clear that all 
the airports studied were not affected equally by airline 
scheduling. Chicago O’Hare International and Newark Liberty 
International airports immediately stand out based upon 
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their percentage of IFR capacity used. As depicted in table 
2, each airport is scheduled over 100% of their IFR 
capacity. These two airports also distinguished themselves 
with regards to their recovery time from the largest number 
of planes scheduled over the IFR capacity.  In each case, 
on a daily basis, it takes each airport at minimum 1 hour 
to recover from over scheduling during their busiest times, 
operating at full capacity, easily pushing many of the 
planes scheduled during that time into the next wave of 
overscheduled aircraft. 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International and New York 
La Guardia airports also stood out based upon their 
percentage of IFR capacity utilized. As depicted in table 
2, each of these airports is scheduled for 94% of their IFR 
capacity, with Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International 
airport very close to 100% at 99.7%. At Atlanta it takes 
daily, on average, 24.8 minutes to recover from over 
scheduling during their busiest time, when operating at 
full capacity, pushing several of the planes scheduled at 
that time back into the next wave of over scheduled 
aircraft.  Conversely, at New York La Guardia airport, when 
operating at full capacity, it only takes 12 minutes to 
recover from the largest over scheduled time period, 
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leaving just enough time for the system to recover before 
the next wave of over scheduled planes hit.  
Houston George Bush Intercontinental, Minneapolis-St. 
Paul International, Philadelphia International, and 
Dallas/Forth Worth International airports were all 
scheduled between 70 and 80% of their IFR capacity during 
the three month period.  None of the airports exceeded any 
over scheduling periods, that would take more than 12 
minutes to recover from, when operating at full capacity, 
leaving enough time for the system to recover before the 
next wave of over scheduled planes hit at any of these 
airports. 
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International and Washington 
Dulles International airport ran with virtually no over 
scheduling and at 57.5% and 50.5% of there IFR capacity, 
leaving them with ample time to recover from any over 
scheduling during the three months. 
Conclusions 
Throughout the analysis of the study if became obvious 
that not all of the airports studied were in danger of 
having severe delay problems based upon the scheduling of 
the airlines. Chicago O’Hare and Newark Liberty 
International airports were, on average, scheduled over 
their IFR capacity for the entire three months.  With the 
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amount of planes scheduled at these two airports, even 
operating at maximum capacity, there is no way for the 
airports to accept air traffic without encountering at 
least moderate delays.  The schedule alone at these two 
airports is already a significant problem at these 
airports. Because of the number of aircraft that are 
overscheduled at certain times during the day there is 
already going to be delays no matter how well the system is 
working. If any other delay inducing phenomenon occurs it 
just adds to the delays that the aircraft are experiencing 
because of the over scheduling. In other words these two 
airports are scheduled so tightly that they cannot accept 
anything that might alter their schedule. When severe 
weather becomes a factor each of these airports may 
encounter delays in excess of 1-2 hours sometimes taking ½ 
a day or more to recover.  
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta and New York La Guardia 
airports schedules are being pushed to a point that there 
is no room for error.  If anything else that could cause 
delays such as weather were to occur these two airports 
will start to encounter moderate delays of around 1 hour. 
The schedule alone at these two airports plays a 
significant role in the overall delays experienced at these 
airports. Because of the number of aircraft that are 
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overscheduled at certain times during the day there is no 
way that the schedule can accept any other delay inducing 
phenomenon to occur. In other words these two airports are 
scheduled so tightly that they cannot accept anything that 
might alter their schedule. 
Of the remaining airports Houston, Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Philadelphia and Dallas/Forth Worth airports really 
have very few scheduling problems.  They all have some 
periods where they are scheduled over their IFR capacity 
but there is enough flexibility that the schedule itself 
will cause only a minor role in the overall delays at these 
airports.  The only time that scheduled delays would cause 
any problems would be when other larger delays such as 
thunderstorms occur.  
Fort Lauderdale and Washington Dulles airports have no 
over scheduling problems to speak of.  The schedule itself 
at these two airports should cause no delays and would play 
an insignificant role in overall delays at the airports. 
Recommendations 
While it is certain that more research needs to be 
done on this topic to verify the findings of this study.  
It was assumed by this researcher that all of the larger 
airports in the United States had a large problem with over 
scheduling. That assumption was incorrect. However it is 
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obvious that at Chicago and Newark airports something has 
to be done to correct the massive over scheduling that is 
occurring. At Atlanta and La Guardia the situation is only 
marginally better.  For the safe and expeditious movement 
of air traffic an airport should never be scheduled over 
its IFR capacity.   
There are no easy solutions to the problem of over 
scheduling. At most airports the government could step in 
and force each airport schedule to be under the IFR 
capacity.  This would ensure that the schedule would be 
flexible enough to withstand other strains on it.  
At airports like Chicago and Newark the situation 
becomes much harder to control.  While forcing these 
airports to schedule under the IFR capacity would even out 
the schedule there isn’t any way that the current number of 
aircraft could ever be scheduled without delay.  At these 
locations the options would be to cut some existing flights 
or build to expand the capacity of the airport. With the 
industry continuing to utilize smaller commuter aircraft 
the problem of over scheduling airports will only grow if 
something is not done. The onus would have to be on the 
government to decide to cut existing flights or build to 
expand the capacity of the airport. 
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